This article provides a comprehensive review of divergent conceptualizations of the “implicit” construct that have emerged in attitude research over the past two decades. In doing so, our goal is to raise awareness of the harmful consequences of conceptual ambiguities associated with this terminology. We identify three main conceptualizations of the “implicitness” construct: the procedural conceptualization (implicit-as-indirect), the functional conceptualization (implicit-as-automatic), and the mental theory conceptualization (implicit-as-associative), as well as two hybrid conceptualizations (implicit-as-indirect-and-automatic, implicit-as-driven-by-affective-gut-reactions). We discuss critical limitations associated with each conceptualization and explain that confusion also arises from their coexistence. We recommend discontinuing the usage of the “implicit” terminology in attitude research and research inspired by it. We offer terminological alternatives aimed at increasing both the precision of theorization and the practical value of future research.

本文对过去二十年来在态度研究中出现的“内隐”结构的不同概念进行了全面回顾。这样做的目的是提高人们对与该术语相关的概念歧义的有害后果的认识。我们确定“隐性”构造的三个主要概念化：过程概念化（隐式作为间接），功能概念化（隐式作为自动）和心理理论概念化（隐式作为联想），以及两种混合概念化（隐式作为间接和自动，隐式作为由情感肠道反应驱动）。我们讨论了与每个概念化相关的关键局限性，并解释了混乱也源于它们的共存。我们建议在态度研究和受其启发的研究中停止使用“隐式”术语。我们提供旨在提高理论化精度和未来研究的实用价值的术语替代方案。