In this paper, I accomplish a conceptual task and a historical task. The conceptual task is to argue that (1) Einstein's Principle of Separability (henceforth “separability”) is not a supervenience principle and that (2) separability and entanglement are compatible. I support (1) by showing that the conclusion of Einstein's incompleteness argument would still follow even if one assumes that the state of a composite system does not supervene on the states of the subsystems, and by showing that what Einstein says in “Quantum Mechanics and Reality” (1948) strongly suggests that separability is not a principle about how subsystem states relate to the state of composite systems. I support (2) by showing that if separability was incompatible with entanglement, then Einstein's argument would be incoherent in a trivial way. Thus, by arguing for (1) and (2) I directly challenge what has been, and still is, a very common reading of separability. The historical task is to offer the first detailed review of the different ways in which separability has been defined by physicists and philosophers in the last 60 years. Among other things, such a review distinguishes three different definitions of the principle, and shows that since the 1990s and up until the present date, it became standard to take separability (as presented by Einstein) to be a supervenience principle.

在本文中，我完成了一个概念性的任务和一个历史性的任务。概念上的任务是争辩说（1）爱因斯坦的可分离性原理（此后称为“可分离性”）不是一种超级原理，并且（2）可分离性和纠缠是兼容的。我支持（1），通过证明即使假设复合系统的状态不超过子系统的状态，爱因斯坦的不完全性论证的结论仍将遵循，并且通过证明爱因斯坦在“量子力学和《现实》（Reality）（1948年）强烈表明，可分离性不是子系统状态如何与复合系统状态相关的原则。我支持（2），表明如果可分离性与纠缠不兼容，那么爱因斯坦的论点将变得无关紧要。从而，通过争辩（1）和（2），我直接挑战过去和现在仍然是非常普遍的可分离性解读。历史任务是对物理学家和哲学家在过去60年中定义可分离性的不同方式进行首次详细审查。除其他事项外，这样的审查区分了该原则的三种不同定义，并表明自1990年代以来直到今天，将可分离性（如爱因斯坦所提出的）作为一种超级原则已成为标准。