Abstract

Representations feature heavily in cognitive science theories about our behavioral repertoire. Their critical feature is its ability to designate (stand in for) spatially or temporally distant properties, so that organizing our behavior with respect to mental/neural representations means organizing our behavior with respect to the otherwise unavailable property they designate. Representations are a powerful tool, but serious problems (grounding, system-detectable error) remain unsolved. Ecological explanations reject representations. However, this has left us without a straightforward vocabulary to engage with “representation-hungry” problems involving spatial or temporal distance, nor the role of the nervous system in cognition. To develop such a vocabulary, here we show that ecological information functions to designate the ecologically scaled dynamical world to an organism. We then show that this designation analysis of information leads to an ecological conceptualization of the neural activity caused by information, and finally we argue these together can support intentional behavior with respect to spatially and temporally distal properties. The way they do so (via designation) does mean information and the related neural activity can be conceptualized as representations; but they do so in a grounded way that remains true to key ecological ontological commitments. We advocate this path for expanding the ecological approach.

摘要

表征在关于我们行为方式的认知科学理论中占有重要地位。他们的关键特征是其指定能力（代表）在空间上或时间上都遥不可及的属性，因此就心理/神经表征组织我们的行为意味着就它们指定的其他不可用属性组织我们的行为。制图表达是一个功能强大的工具，但仍未解决严重的问题（接地，系统可检测的错误）。生态学解释拒绝表述。但是，这使我们没有一个简单的词汇来处理涉及空间或时间距离的“代表性表示”问题，也没有神经系统在认知中的作用。为了开发这样的词汇表，我们在这里展示了生态信息的功能是将生态学上的动态世界指定给有机体。然后，我们表明对信息的这种指定分析导致了由信息引起的神经活动的生态概念化，最后我们认为，这些一起可以支持相对于时空远端特性的故意行为。他们这样做的方式（通过指定）确实意味着信息，并且可以将相关的神经活动概念化为表示形式。但是他们这样做的方式是扎根，对主要的生态本体论承诺仍然如此。我们提倡这条扩大生态方法的道路。但是他们这样做的方式是扎根，对主要的生态本体论承诺仍然如此。我们提倡这条扩大生态方法的道路。但是他们这样做的方式是扎根，对主要的生态本体论承诺仍然如此。我们提倡这条扩大生态方法的道路。