Abstract

In this article, we investigate the foundations for a Gibsonian neuroscience. There is an increasingly influential current in neuroscience based on pragmatic and selectionist principles, which we think can contribute to ecological psychology. Starting from ecological psychology, we identify three basic constraints any Gibsonian neuroscience needs to adhere to: nonreconstructive perception, vicarious functioning, and selectionist self-organization. We discuss two previous attempts to integrate affordances with neuroscience: Reed’s ecological rendering of Edelman’s selectionism as well as Dreyfus’ phenomenological interpretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics. Reed and Dreyfus face the problem of how to account for “value.” We then show how the free-energy principle, an increasingly dominant framework in theoretical neuroscience, is rooted in both Freeman’s neurodynamics and Edelman’s selectionism. The free-energy principle accounts for value in terms of selective anticipation. The selection pressures at work on the agent shape its selective sensitivity to the relevant affordances in the environment. By being responsive to the relevant affordances in the environment, an agent comes to have grip on its interactions with the environment and can thrive in its ecological niche.

摘要

在本文中，我们研究了吉布森神经科学的基础。基于实用主义和选择主义原则的神经科学领域中，有越来越多的影响力，我们认为这可以有助于生态心理学。从生态心理学出发，我们确定了吉布森神经科学需要遵守的三个基本限制条件：非重建知觉，替代功能和选择主义的自组织。我们讨论了将供求与神经科学相结合的两次尝试：里德对爱德曼选择主义的生态学诠释，以及德雷福斯对弗里曼神经动力学的现象学解释。里德和德雷福斯面临着如何计算“价值”的问题。然后，我们展示了自由能原理，这是理论神经科学中一个日益占主导地位的框架，植根于弗里曼的神经动力学和爱德曼的选择主义。自由能原理根据选择性预期来解释价值。作用于试剂的选择压力决定了它对环境中相关能力的选择性敏感性。通过对环境中的相关能力做出响应，代理商可以控制与环境的相互作用，并可以在其生态环境中蓬勃发展。