Abstract

An underlying bias of contemporary cognitive science is that the brain and nervous system are in the business of carrying out computations and building representations. Gibson’s ecological approach, in contrast, is decidedly noncomputational and nonrepresentational. How, then, are we to construe the role of brain and nervous system? We consider this question against the backdrop of evidence for rich achievements in perception and action by agents without brains or nervous systems. If fundamental coordination of perception and action does not require a neural substrate, then what value is added in having one? And if the neural substrate is not in the representational–computational business, then what business is it in? We pursue answers grounded in the constraints of macroscopic, multicellular life and thermodynamics.

摘要

当代认知科学的根本偏见是大脑和神经系统正在从事计算和建立表示的工作。相比之下，吉布森的生态学方法显然是非计算性和非代表性的。那么，我们如何解释大脑和神经系统的作用呢？我们以没有大脑或神经系统的特工在感知和行动方面取得丰硕成就的证据为背景来考虑这个问题。如果感知和动作的基本协调不需要神经基础，那么拥有一个就可以增加什么价值？而且，如果神经基质不在代表性计算业务中，那么它属于什么业务？我们寻求基于宏观，多细胞生命和热力学约束的答案。