Abstract

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits U.S.-related firms from making bribes abroad. We analyze the FCPA’s effects in a model of competition between a U.S. and foreign firm for contracts in a host country. If the FCPA only applies to the U.S. firm, it reduces that firm’s competitiveness and either increases bribery by the foreign firm or reduces overall investment. If the FCPA also applies to foreign firms, it reduces total bribery, and in host countries with high corruption levels, it increases total investment. The model suggests that the FCPA will deter bribery and stimulate investment while not disadvantaging U.S. firms if its enforcement is aimed at firms who engaged in bribery in highly corrupt countries and whose main competitors are also subject to the FCPA.

中文翻译：

---

《反海外腐败法》对竞争，贿赂和投资的影响

摘要

《反海外腐败法》（FCPA）禁止与美国有关的公司在国外行贿。我们以美国与外国公司在东道国之间竞争合同的模型来分析FCPA的影响。如果FCPA仅适用于美国公司，则会降低该公司的竞争力，并增加外国公司的贿赂或减少总投资。如果《反海外腐败法》也适用于外国公司，它将减少总贿赂，而在腐败程度高的东道国，则将增加总投资。该模型表明，FCPA的执法旨在针对在高度腐败国家从事贿赂并且其主要竞争对手也受FCPA约束的公司，这将阻止贿赂并刺激投资，同时不会不利于美国公司。