Abstract

In recent years, numerous observers have raised concerns about “policing for profit,” or the deployment of law enforcement resources to raise revenue rather than to provide public safety. However, identifying the causal effects of fiscal incentives on law enforcement behavior has remained elusive. In a regression discontinuity design implemented on traffic citation and accident data from Saskatchewan, Canada between 1995 and 2016, a fiscal rule reducing by 75% the share of traffic fine revenue captured by the province in towns above 500 in 1996 population is associated with increased rates of accidents, accident-involved vehicles, accident costs, and accident-related injuries in towns just above this threshold, relative to towns just below the threshold. Further, cited drivers in towns just below this threshold are given fewer days to pay their fines and are less likely to pay their fines on time, leading to higher risks of late fees and license suspensions. These findings suggest that fiscal incentives can indeed distort the allocation of law enforcement effort, with distributional consequences for both public safety and economic well-being.

中文翻译：

---

执法中的财政激励措施

摘要

近年来，许多观察家提出了对“为利益而治安”或部署执法资源以增加收入而非提供公共安全的担忧。但是，要确定财政激励措施对执法行为的因果关系仍然难以捉摸。在1995年至2016年间根据加拿大萨斯喀彻温省的交通引文和事故数据实施的回归不连续性设计中，一项财政规则将1996年人口在​​500个以上的城镇中该省捕获的交通罚款收入份额减少了75％，这与税率上升相关相对于仅低于此阈值的城镇，在此阈值以上的城镇中发生的事故，与事故有关的车辆，事故成本以及与事故相关的伤害。进一步，在低于此阈值的城镇中，被引证的驾驶员将获得较少的时间支付罚款，也不太可能准时支付罚款，从而导致滞纳金和吊销执照的风险更高。这些发现表明，财政激励措施的确会扭曲执法工作的分配，给公共安全和经济福祉带来分配后果。