This article explores the selection of disputes for litigation in a setting with two-sided incomplete information and correlated signals. The models analyzed here suggest that Priest and Klein’s conclusion that close cases are more likely to go to trial than extreme cases remains largely valid when their model is interpreted as involving correlated, two-sided incomplete information and is updated (i) to incorporate take-it-or-leave-it offers or the Chatterjee–Samuelson mechanism, (ii) to take into account the credibility of the plaintiff’s threat to go to trial, and (iii) to allow parties to make sophisticated, Bayesian inferences based on knowledge of the distribution of disputes. On the other hand, Priest and Klein’s prediction that the plaintiff will win 50% of litigated cases is sensitive to bargaining and parameter assumptions.

中文翻译：

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具有相关两面不完整信息的诉讼和选择

本文探讨在双方信息不完整且信号相关的情况下，如何选择诉讼纠纷。此处分析的模型表明，当Priest和Klein的模型被解释为涉及相关的，两面不完整的信息并进行了更新（i）包含有以下事实时，结论：Priest和Klein的结论是，与极端案件相比，亲密案件更有可能接受审判。提供或不提供它，或提供查特吉-萨缪尔森机制，（ii）考虑到原告威胁进行审判的可信性，以及（iii）允许当事方基于以下知识做出复杂的贝叶斯推理：争议的分配。另一方面，Priest和Klein关于原告将赢得50％诉讼案件的预测对议价和参数假设很敏感。