This study investigates the optimal nature of law making under uncertainty. I focus on a case in which a harmful activity will be subjected to some regulatory measures (a standard, exposure to liability, or a corrective tax). The bene fits and costs of precaution are ex-ante uncertain, and this places a risk burden on both injurers and victims. The optimal policy should, at the same time, strike a balance between benefi ts and costs of the measures, and attenuate the ex-ante risk. Whether measures should be made stronger or softer depends on the size and the sign of the shocks affecting the parties (positive or negative) and their disposition towards risk. With corrective taxes, it also depends on the elasticity of precautions with respect to the tax rate.

中文翻译：

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规避风险主体的法律变迁：理论的概括

这项研究调查了不确定性下立法的最优性质。我关注的是有害活动将受到某些监管措施（标准，承担责任或纠正税）的情况。事先的不确定性和预防成本是不确定的，这给伤害者和受害者都带来了风险负担。最佳政策应同时在收益和措施成本之间取得平衡，并减轻事前风险。是否应采取更大或更软的措施取决于影响各方（正面或负面）的冲击的规模和迹象以及对风险的处置。对于矫正税，这还取决于税率方面的防范措施的弹性。