ABSTRACT

Self-regulation relies on private ordering, whereby private actors make and enforce rules governing their conduct. Private ordering is not outside the reach of public law principles, making the certainty of private ordering dependent on the predictability of whether public law principles apply. This article examines the London Stock Exchange's self-regulation of AIM (Alternative Investment Market), arguing that doctrinal uncertainty over the availability of judicial review undermines private ordering by hindering informed ex ante bargaining and contracting. Public law uncertainty imposes transaction costs on self-regulatory actors who must reappraise or revise their contracts to account for unpredictable public law obligations, such as when the LSE doubled the length of the AIM Disciplinary Handbook in 2018 following an unsuccessful claim for judicial review. This article concludes that regulation on AIM is not likely sufficiently public to be amenable to judicial review, which would increase certainty of contracting in the financial system.

抽象的

自我调节依赖于私人秩序，私人行为者由此制定并执行有关其行为的规则。私人秩序不是公法原则所能及的，这使得私人秩序的确定性取决于公法原则是否适用的可预测性。本文研究了伦敦证券交易所对AIM（另类投资市场）的自我监管，认为教义上对司法复核的不确定性阻碍了事先知情的议价和签约，从而破坏了私人秩序。公法的不确定性给必须自我重新评估或修订合同以应对不可预测的公法义务的自我监管行为者带来交易成本，例如，由于未成功进行司法审查而导致LSE在2018年将AIM纪律手册的篇幅加倍时。本文得出的结论是，关于AIM的法规不太可能公开到足以接受司法审查的要求，这将增加金融系统中合同的确定性。