ABSTRACT

The growing use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure delivery has rekindled the public versus private cost-of-capital debate. Early debate concluded that the social cost of public-sector capital is below that of private capital because risk can be spread across numerous taxpayers. Intervening research focused on the agency costs that arise due to increased separation between equity holders and managers and the various mechanisms to control those agency costs. We analyze differences in public versus private residual claims and their associated agency costs. We conclude that earlier discussions that omitted agency-cost analysis should be revisited.

摘要

在基础设施交付中越来越多地使用公私合作伙伴关系 (PPP) 重新点燃了公共与私人资本成本的争论。早期辩论得出的结论是，公共部门资本的社会成本低于私人资本，因为风险可以分散在众多纳税人身上。干预研究的重点是由于股权持有人和管理者之间的分离增加而产生的代理成本以及控制这些代理成本的各种机制。我们分析了公共与私人剩余索取权及其相关代理成本的差异。我们的结论是，应该重新审视先前省略代理成本分析的讨论。