Ten years after the financial crisis of 2008, there is widespread agreement that the boom in mortgage lending and its subsequent reversal were at the core of the Great Recession. We survey the existing evidence, which suggests that inflated house-price expectations across the economy played a central role in driving both the demand for and the supply of mortgage credit before the crisis. The great misnomer of the 2008 crisis is that it was not a subprime crisis but rather a middle-class crisis. Inflated house-price expectations led households across all income groups, especially the middle class, to increase their demand for housing and mortgage leverage. Similarly, banks lent against increasing collateral values and underestimated the risk of defaults. We highlight how these emerging facts have essential implications for policy.

中文翻译：

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住房和抵押市场在金融危机中的作用

在2008年金融危机发生十年后，人们普遍同意，抵押贷款的繁荣及其随后的逆转是大萧条的核心。我们调查了现有证据，这表明整个经济中虚高的房价预期在推动危机前推动抵押贷款需求和供应方面起着核心作用。2008年危机的严重误称是，它不是次贷危机，而是中产阶级危机。房价预期过高导致所有收入群体（尤其是中产阶级）的家庭增加了对住房和抵押贷款的需求。同样，银行借出抵押品价值的增长，低估了违约的风险。我们强调这些新兴事实如何对政策产生实质性影响。