We provide a comprehensive overview of shareholder litigation against auditors since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The number of lawsuits per year has declined, dismissals have increased, and settlements in recent years have declined. Our study asks why. Tests indicate that the decline cannot be attributed solely to increases in audit quality, leading us to consider whether Supreme Court cases limiting the scope of Rule 10b-5 against private actors may have led to the decline. To study this possibility, we focus on the Supreme Court’s 2007 and 2011 rulings in Tellabs v. Makor and Janus v. First Derivative, respectively. Our analysis provides strong evidence that the higher liability standards imposed by Janus significantly reduced auditors’ liability exposure, but we find only limited evidence that the pleading standards imposed by Tellabs had a significant effect.

中文翻译：

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审计师责任格局的变化

自《私人证券诉讼改革法案》通过以来，我们对股东针对审计师的诉讼提供了全面的概述。每年的诉讼数量有所减少，解雇的数量有所增加，近年来和解的数量有所减少。我们的研究问为什么。测试表明，下降的原因不能仅归因于审计质量的提高，这使我们考虑了最高法院针对私人行为者限制第10b-5条范围的案件是否可能导致了下降。为了研究这种可能性，我们分别关注最高法院2007年和2011年在Tellabs诉Makor案和Janus诉First Derivative案中的裁决。我们的分析提供了有力的证据，表明Janus提出的更高的责任标准大大降低了审计师的责任风险，