Incentive-based mechanisms, such as payments for ecosystem services (PES) are increasingly being employed to encourage adoption of biodiversity conservation practices in agriculture. Farmers’ participation in a PES depends – amongst other factors – on their interactions with previous programs and schemes. This research analyses how the institutional characteristics and interactions of incentive-based mechanisms shape the type of farmers’ participation and the achievement of desired socio-ecological outcomes. This research focusses on the institutional frameworks of two programs in the Province of Quebec, Canada: the ‘Prime-Vert’ Program (public agri-environment scheme) and the ‘Alternative Land Use Services’ (ALUS) initiative (a privately-funded “PES” scheme). The institutional prescriptions of these two programs were examined and compared through the lenses of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. We reveal the impact of the institutional framework on farmers’ participation by assessing the degree of farmers’ engagement in the implementation and management of schemes. Our results showed a strong dependence of the private PES on the public scheme, rendering both programs ultimately managed under the remit of the provincial government. While the complementarity of both programs diversifies sources of funding for farmers, the presence of rigid rules governing these incentives tend to treat farmers as passive beneficiaries of a network of centralized subsidies which they have little control over. This compromises farmers’ autonomy as the rigidity of rules impedes any attempt to achieve active participation in the design and implementation of agri-environmental practices.

中文翻译：

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混合公共和私人农业环境计划：对加拿大魁北克农民参与的影响

越来越多地采用基于奖励的机制，例如生态系统服务付款（PES），以鼓励在农业中采用生物多样性保护做法。除其他因素外，农民参与生态系统服务付费取决于他们与先前计划和计划的互动。这项研究分析了基于激励机制的制度特征和相互作用如何塑造农民参与的类型以及实现预期的社会生态成果。这项研究的重点是加拿大魁北克省的两个计划的制度框架：“ Prime-Vert”计划（公共农业环境计划）和“ Alternative Land Use Services”（ALUS）计划（由私人资助的“ PES”方案）。通过机构分析和发展框架的角度对这两个程序的机构规定进行了检查和比较。通过评估农民参与计划实施和管理的程度，我们揭示了制度框架对农民参与的影响。我们的结果表明，私人PES对公共计划的强烈依赖，使得这两个计划最终都在省政府的职权范围内进行管理。虽然这两个计划的互补性使农民的资金来源多样化，但管理这些激励措施的僵化规则的存在往往使农民成为他们无法控制的集中补贴网络的被动受益者。