Many global fisheries have transitioned to rights-based management to improve bioeconomic outcomes, but several fishing communities have experienced negative social impacts. Negative social impacts are often attributed to a focus on economic efficiency and resource sustainability, with less focus on the distributional equity among fishery participants. Among rights-based systems, limited entry has been used for over a century to reduce excess fleet capacity. In 1991, a limited entry permit system was initiated in the Hawai‘i longline fleet, following years of rapid growth. The Hawai‘i system did not set an ownership cap, which presented a natural experiment to examine distributional equity in the fleet over time. We examined permit ownership changes in the Hawai‘i longline fishery using 27 years of permit transactions, then linked it to logbook landings and commercial dealer data to examine revenue inequality using the gini coefficient. We also analyzed property rights components to better understand how institutional factors affected ownership changes. We found that three distinct permit ownership groups emerged and permits, landings, and revenue became increasingly consolidated among multiple permit owners. The gini coefficient indicated that how the fishery was analyzed significantly affected measures of revenue inequality. One measure indicated that revenue inequality in the Hawai‘i limited entry system was similar to other U.S. fisheries managed by catch shares. Without an ownership cap, distributional equity in the Hawai‘i longline fleet changed significantly over time. Our findings indicate that distributional equity should be considered prior to initiating rights-based transitions in other global fisheries

中文翻译：

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夏威夷最大的商业渔业中基于权利的管理，竞争和分配公平

许多全球渔业已过渡到基于权利的管理，以改善生物经济成果，但一些捕捞社区遭受了负面的社会影响。负面的社会影响通常归因于对经济效率和资源可持续性的关注，而对渔业参与者之间的分配公平的关注较少。在基于权利的系统中，有限进入已经使用了一个多世纪，以减少过剩的机队容量。1991年，经过多年的快速发展，夏威夷延绳钓船队开始实行有限的进入许可证制度。夏威夷系统没有设置所有权上限，这是一个自然的实验，可以检查机队随时间的分配权益。我们使用27年的许可证交易研究了夏威夷延绳钓渔业的许可证所有权变更，然后将其链接到日志记录和商业交易商数据，以使用基尼系数检查收入不平等。我们还分析了产权组成部分，以更好地了解制度因素如何影响所有权变化。我们发现出现了三个不同的许可证所有权组，并且许可证，着陆点和收益在多个许可证所有者之间越来越多地合并。基尼系数表明，渔业的分析方式显着影响了收入不平等的衡量指标。一项措施表明，夏威夷有限入境制度中的收入不平等与其他由捕捞量管理的美国渔业相似。没有所有权上限，夏威夷延绳钓船队的分配权益会随时间发生重大变化。