Abstract

This article presents the first empirical examination of giving to §501(c)(4) organizations, which have recently become important players in U.S. politics. Unlike gifts to charity, donations to a 501(c)(4) are not legally deductible. Yet, gifts to c(4) organizations are highly elastic to the after-tax price of charitable giving. At the lower end of the observed tax price range, c(4) giving falls with tax price, consistent with the hypothesis that giving to c(3) and c(4) organizations are substitutes. Over the top quarter of the distribution of tax price, however, gifts to c(4) organizations are negatively correlated with the after-tax price of giving to charity. That is, donors appear to respond as though the deduction subsidized their gift to a c(4). Donor responses to benefits for which they are not eligible may reflect the low salience of legal limitations or deliberate overclaiming. These results imply subsidies for charity can crowd out or in donations to c(4) organizations, with potential implications for U.S. politics. I cannot observe whether donors claim tax deductions for ineligible gifts, so the net results for the Treasury are unclear.

中文翻译：

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暗金补贴？税收政策和对第501（c）（4）条组织的捐赠

摘要

本文介绍了对§501（c）（4）组织的捐赠的首次实证研究，这些组织最近已成为美国政治中的重要角色。与慈善捐赠不同，捐赠给501（c）（4）的行为不合法扣除。但是，送给c（4）组织的礼物对慈善捐赠的税后价格具有高度的弹性。在观察到的税收价格范围的较低端，c（4）的付出随税收价格的下降而下降，这与对c（3）和c（4）的组织给予替代的假设相一致。但是，在税收价格分配的最高季度中，向c（4）组织的赠与与慈善捐赠的税后价格呈负相关。就是说，捐助者似乎做出了反应，好像扣除额补贴了他们对ac（4）的礼物。捐助者对不符合其资格的福利的回应可能反映出法律限制的低估性或故意过分夸大其词。这些结果表明，对慈善机构的补贴可能排挤或捐赠给c（4）个组织，这可能会对美国政治产生潜在影响。我无法观察到捐赠者是否要求对不合格的礼物进行税收减免，因此财政部的净结果尚不清楚。