Abstract

Reasons evidentialism is the view that normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of evidence about oughts (i.e., propositions concerning whether or not S ought to Φ). In this paper, I defend a new reason-evidentialist account according to which normative reasons are evidence against propositions of the form S ought not to Φ. The arguments for my view have two strands. First of all, I argue that my view can account for three difficulty cases, cases where (i) a fact is both a reason for S to Φ and a reason for S not to Φ, (ii) a fact is both evidence for the proposition that S ought to Φ and evidence for the proposition that S ought not to Φ, and (iii) the subject is genuinely torn, as far as reasons are concerned, between Φ-ing and not Φ-ing. Second, I argue that my view can account for what a reason against S Φ-ing is.

摘要

理由证据论认为，可以根据关于应有的证据（即关于S是否应取Φ的命题）来分析规范性理由。在本文中，我捍卫了一个新的理性证据主义者的论证，根据该论证，规范性理由是反对形式S的命题不应为Φ。我的观点有两个方面。首先，我认为我的观点可以解释三种困难情况，其中（i）事实既是S为Φ的原因，又是S不为Φ的原因，（ii）事实既是S成为Φ的证据。 S应该为Φ的命题以及S不应为Φ的命题的证据，并且（iii）就原因而言，在Φ-ing与非Φ-ing之间，对象确实被撕裂了。其次，我认为我的观点可以解释反对SΦ-ing是什么原因。