If board-level controls matter, the introduction of the 2008 Companies Act with its enhanced legislative requirements, should have a positive impact on firm performance. To assess board-level controls this study developed two unique control indexes to assess the boards of 84 companies over three years. The study focuses on companies on the SRI index as they have a greater focus on sustainability and transparent disclosure of board-level controls including separation of duties, monitoring, goal-aligned remuneration and oversight. The first index uses 23 board-level control indicators (CI) and the second 19 board-level direction indicators (DI). The two indexes were assessed using fixed effects estimation methods against current and negatively lagged firm performance proxies. Results show that board-level controls matter as both indexes were positively related to return on assets (RoA), however, only DI was highly significant. Both indexes changed to a negative relationship to next year’s return on assets (NYRoA), again highly significant for DI. The change to a negative relationship suggests a timing and information asymmetry problem. CI was positively related to the natural log of enterprise value per share (LEV) with a low level of significance while the positive relation continues to the next year’s natural log of enterprise value per share (LNYEV) that was highly significant. The latter suggests that the controlling role of the board are continued to be valued by the market.

中文翻译：

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董事会级别的控制重要吗？–机构对南非社会责任投资（SRI）公司董事会的看法

如果董事会层面的控制很重要，则引入具有增强立法要求的《 2008年公司法》应该对公司绩效产生积极影响。为了评估董事会级别的控制，这项研究开发了两个独特的控制指标来评估84家公司在三年内的董事会。这项研究主要针对采用SRI指数的公司，因为它们更加关注可持续性和对董事会级别控制的透明披露，包括职责分离，监督，目标一致的薪酬和监督。第一个索引使用23个板级控制指标（CI），第二个索引使用19个板级方向指标（DI）。使用固定效应估计方法针对当前和负滞后的公司绩效代理评估了这两个指数。结果表明，董事会层面的控制至关重要，因为这两个指标都与资产回报率（RoA）呈正相关，但是，只有DI才具有很高的意义。两项指数均与明年的资产收益率（NYRoA）呈负相关，这对DI来说同样意义重大。变为负关系意味着时间和信息不对称问题。CI与显着性较低的自然每股企业价值（LEV）呈正相关，而与明年显着高的明年自然每股企业价值（LNYEV）呈正相关。后者表明，董事会的控制角色继续受到市场的重视。两项指数均与明年的资产收益率（NYRoA）呈负相关，这对DI来说同样意义重大。变为负关系意味着时间和信息不对称问题。CI与显着性较低的自然每股企业价值（LEV）呈正相关，而与明年显着高的明年自然每股企业价值（LNYEV）呈正相关。后者表明，董事会的控制角色继续受到市场的重视。两项指数均与明年的资产收益率（NYRoA）呈负相关，这对DI而言同样意义重大。变为负关系意味着时间和信息不对称问题。CI与显着性较低的自然每股企业价值（LEV）呈正相关，而与明年显着高的明年自然每股企业价值（LNYEV）呈正相关。后者表明，董事会的控制角色继续受到市场的重视。CI与显着性较低的自然每股企业价值（LEV）呈正相关，而与明年显着高的明年自然每股企业价值（LNYEV）呈正相关。后者表明，董事会的控制角色继续受到市场的重视。CI与显着性较低的自然每股企业价值（LEV）呈正相关，而与明年显着高的明年自然每股企业价值（LNYEV）呈正相关。后者表明，董事会的控制角色继续受到市场的重视。