Abstract

Based on experimental data, this paper confirms, in a controlled environment, converging theoretical and empirical results that, when individuals insure, they choose to insure themselves with a full cover. This insurance behaviour creates an opportunity for the public authority to drive people to enter the insurance market where they would buy full insurance. This paper also sheds light on the risks of an opportunistic insurers’ behaviour. This heuristic challenges the efficiency of separating contracts designed to address adverse selection issues. Indeed, a strong preference for full contracts may encourage low-risk individuals to turn to (full) contracts designed for high-risk individuals, yielding advantageous selection opportunities for insurers. However, if this heuristic strengthens the high-risks’ reluctance for partial insurance, it may increase the efficiency of the separating contracts, and the low-risk individuals suffer less from adverse selection.

摘要

基于实验数据，本文在可控的环境中证实了理论和经验结果的融合，即当个人投保时，他们选择全额投保。这种保险行为为公共机构创造了一个机会，促使人们进入保险市场，在那里他们将购买全额保险。本文还阐明了机会保险公司行为的风险。这种启发式方法挑战了旨在解决逆向选择问题的合同分离效率。确实，强烈倾向于全额合同可能会鼓励低风险的个人转向为高风险个人设计的（全额）合同，从而为保险公司提供有利的选择机会。但是，如果这种启发式方法增强了高风险人士对部分保险的不愿，