Abstract This Article argues that the act of formally declaring war entails a measure of explicit commitment on the part of American political actors that raises the cost of failure and motivates politicians to see engagements through to a decisive end, fulfilling the role of a contract or institutional commitment device. It argues that undeclared conflicts, lacking such a device, are more likely to end on less decisive and less favorable terms to the United States. On this basis, it explains the emergence of a decades-long trend of protracted, unsuccessful, and indecisive military engagements by the United States as having emerged from the erosion of a constitutionally established separation of powers with respect to the initiation and administration of foreign military conflicts. In defense of this theory, it uses case studies to assess the relevance of its predictions and to weigh potential objections involving selection bias and imperfect information.

中文翻译：

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宣战与美国胜利：寻求有效承诺

摘要本文认为，正式宣战的行为需要美国政治行为者采取明确的承诺措施，这增加了失败的成本，并激励政客将交战活动视为决定性的目标，履行合同或机构的作用承诺装置。它认为，缺乏这样一种手段的未宣布的冲突更有可能以对美国的决定性较弱和不利的条件结束。在此基础上，它解释了美国长期，不成功和优柔寡断的军事接触趋势的出现，这种趋势是由于宪法确立的三权分立对外国军事的发起和管理的侵蚀而产生的冲突。为了捍卫这一理论，