The bulk of literature on the security dilemma has examined the phenomenon within the context of rivalry between great powers of roughly equal strength (for instance, the United States-Soviet nuclear arms race). Yet no study has examined the implications of power asymmetry between a strong power and a weak one when they are facing the security dilemma in their interaction. This manuscript shall examine how the asymmetry of interaction in the United States-North Korean security dilemma has presented repeated obstacles for the United States in seeking the denuclearization of North Korea. The asymmetry of their rivalry has significant implications for how Washington and Pyongyang view one another in their interaction. This asymmetry has created challenges for Washington as well as Pyongyang, as illustrated through this empirical case study’s analysis of how successive United States White House administrations since 1993 have responded to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. In this regard, it is possible the asymmetry of their interaction has become so deeply internalized that North Korea is, effectively, past a “point of no return” insofar as its nuclear program is concerned.

中文翻译：

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美朝不对称安全困境：过了核不归路？

大部分关于安全困境的文献都在实力大致相当的大国之间竞争的背景下研究了这一现象（例如，美苏核军备竞赛）。然而，当强国和弱国在互动中面临安全困境时，没有研究考察强国和弱国之间权力不对称的含义。这份手稿将研究美朝安全困境中互动的不对称性如何为美国寻求朝鲜无核化造成反复障碍。他们竞争的不对称对华盛顿和平壤在互动中如何看待彼此具有重要意义。这种不对称给华盛顿和平壤带来了挑战，正如这个实证案例研究对自 1993 年以来美国白宫历届政府如何应对朝鲜核野心的分析所说明的那样。在这方面，他们互动的不对称性可能已经深深地内化了，以至于就其核计划而言，朝鲜实际上已经过了“不归路”。