Recent years have seen a revival of debates about the role of business and the sources of business power in postindustrial political economies. Scholarly accounts commonly distinguish between structural sources of business power, connected to its privileged position in capitalist economies, and instrumental sources, related to direct forms of lobbying by business actors. The authors argue that this distinction overlooks an important third source of business power, which they conceptualize as institutional business power. Institutional business power results when state actors delegate public functions to private business actors. Over time, through policy feedback and lock-in effects, institutional business power contributes to an asymmetrical dependence of the state on the continued commitment of private business actors. This article elaborates the theoretical argument behind this claim, providing empirical examples of growing institutional business power in education in Germany, Sweden, and the United States.

中文翻译：

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商业力量的制度来源

近年来，关于商业角色和商业力量在后工业政治经济中的来源的争论再度升温。学术报告通常区分商业权力的结构性来源，与其在资本主义经济中的特权地位有关，而工具性来源则与商业行为者的直接游说形式有关。作者认为，这种区别忽略了商业权力的第三个重要来源，他们将其概念化为机构商业权力。当国家行为者将公共职能委托给私营企业行为者时，就会产生制度性商业权力。随着时间的推移，通过政策反馈和锁定效应，机构商业权力导致国家对私营企业参与者持续承诺的不对称依赖。