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Local Order, Policing, and Bribes
World Politics ( IF 2.605 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-10 , DOI: 10.1017/s0043887120000064
Juan Fernando Tellez , Erik Wibbels , Anirudh Krishna

Day-to-day policing represents a fundamental interface between citizens and states. Yet even in the most capable states, local policing varies enormously from one community to the next. The authors seek to understand this variation and in doing so make three contributions: First, they conceptualize communities and individuals as networks more or less capable of demanding high-quality policing. Second, they present original survey data and semistructured interviews on local policing from over one hundred sixty slums, eight thousand households, and one hundred seventy informal neighborhood leaders in India that contribute to the nascent empirical work on comparative policing and order. Third, they find evidence that well-connected individuals and densely connected neighborhoods express greater confidence in and satisfaction with local policing. Critically, these differences do not appear to be a function of a lower propensity for local conflict but rather of an increased capacity to leverage neighborhood leaders to mediate relations with the police. The combination of analytics and empirics in this article provides insight into the conditions under which individuals and communities experience the police as expropriators of rents or neutral providers of order.

中文翻译:

地方秩序、治安和贿赂

日常警务是公民与国家之间的基本接口。然而,即使在最有能力的州,地方治安也因社区而异。作者试图理解这种变化,并在此过程中做出了三个贡献:首先,他们将社区和个人概念化为或多或少能够要求高质量警务的网络。其次,他们提供了来自印度 160 多个贫民窟、8000 户家庭和 170 名非正式社区领导人的关于地方警务的原始调查数据和半结构化访谈,这些数据有助于比较警务和秩序的新兴实证研究。第三,他们发现证据表明,人脉广泛的个人和人口密集的社区对地方治安表现出更大的信心和满意度。至关重要的是,这些差异似乎并不是由于地方冲突倾向较低,而是由于利用邻里领导人调解与警方关系的能力增强。本文中分析和经验的结合提供了对个人和社区将警察视为租金征收者或中立秩序提供者的条件的洞察。
更新日期:2020-06-10
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