Governments in both developing and developed economies play an active role in labor markets in the form of providing both formal public sector jobs and employment through public workfare programs. We refer to this as employment targeting. In the context of a simple search and matching friction model, we show that the propensity for the public sector to target more employment can increase the unemployment rate in the economy and lead to an increase in the size of the informal sector. Employment targeting can therefore have perverse effects on labor market outcomes.

中文翻译：

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摩擦性劳动力市场中的就业目标

发展中经济体和发达经济体的政府在劳动力市场中发挥积极作用，通过公共工作福利计划提供正式的公共部门工作和就业机会。我们将此称为就业目标。在一个简单的搜索和匹配摩擦模型的背景下，我们表明公共部门以增加就业为目标的倾向会增加经济中的失业率并导致非正规部门规模的增加。因此，就业目标可能会对劳动力市场结果产生不利影响。