It is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.

中文翻译：

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模糊性理论和法律理论

人们普遍认为，什么样的语言模糊性理论是正确的，对法哲学的辩论有影响。我不同意。我认为，特定的模糊性理论对法律理论和实践的实质性问题的影响并不像人们通常认为的那样深远。我关注文献中讨论的四个推定含义，涉及 (i) 法律模糊性的价值，(ii) 法律不确定性的可能性和价值，(iii) 法治的可能性，以及 (iv) 强大的自由裁量权. 我以一些方法论的评论作为结束。划定关于传统意义、法律内容确定、法律解释和司法实践规范的问题，可以激发对模糊性、解释性和法律的整体理论空间的更清晰的答案和更精细的理解。