How do firms protect themselves against infringements of their property rights by their own government? The authors develop a theory based on international law and joint asset ownership with foreign firms. Investment agreements protect the assets of foreign firms but are not available to domestic firms. This segmentation of the property rights environment creates a rationale for international financial relationships between firms. By forming financial relationships with foreign firms, domestic firms gain indirect coverage from the property rights available to foreign firms under investment agreements. If a government is less likely to violate the property rights of covered foreign firms, it is also less likely to violate property rights for assets held jointly by domestic and foreign firms. This article presents systematic evidence from data on the activities of firms in countries that have investment agreements with the United States. International financial relationships between firms, through mergers and acquisitions as well as through bond and equity issues, are more common where property rights are weak. The theory suggests a political logic to the fragmentation of firm-ownership stakes across jurisdictions, offers an institutional explanation of international financial flows, and identifies new distributional consequences of international law.

中文翻译：

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外国融资和产权的国际来源

企业如何保护自己免受本国政府对其财产权的侵犯？作者发展了一种基于国际法和与外国公司共同资产所有权的理论。投资协议保护外国公司的资产，但不适用于国内公司。产权环境的这种分割为公司之间的国际金融关系创造了基本原理。通过与外国公司建立财务关系，国内公司间接获得了外国公司根据投资协议可获得的财产权。如果政府不太可能侵犯受管辖的外国公司的财产权，那么它也不太可能侵犯国内外公司共同持有的资产的财产权。本文提供了来自与美国签订投资协议的国家的公司活动数据的系统证据。公司之间通过并购以及债券和股权发行的国际金融关系在产权薄弱的情况下更为常见。该理论提出了跨司法管辖区公司所有权股权分散的政治逻辑，为国际资金流动提供了制度解释，并确定了国际法的新分配后果。