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Strategic Violence during Democratization: Evidence from Myanmar
World Politics ( IF 2.605 ) Pub Date : 2019-03-12 , DOI: 10.1017/s0043887118000308
Darin Christensen , Mai Nguyen , Renard Sexton

abstractDemocratic transitions are often followed by conflict. This article explores one explanation: the military’s strategic use of violence to retain control of economically valuable regions. The authors uncover this dynamic in Myanmar, a country transitioning from four decades of military rule. Fearing that the new civilian government will assert authority over jade mining, the military initiated violence in mining townships. Using geocoded data on conflict and jade mines, the authors find evidence for this strategic use of violence. As Myanmar started to transition in 2011, conflicts instigated by the military in jademining areas sharply rose. The article also addresses alternative explanations, including a shift in the military’s strategy, colocation of mines and military headquarters, commodity prices, opposition to a controversial dam, and trends specific to Kachin State. With implications beyond Myanmar, the authors argue that outgoing generals can use instability to retain rents where plausible challengers to state authority provide a pretense for violence.

中文翻译:

民主化期间的战略暴力:来自缅甸的证据

摘要民主转型往往伴随着冲突。本文探讨了一种解释:军队战略性地使用暴力来保持对具有经济价值的地区的控制。作者在缅甸发现了这种动态,这个国家正在从四个十年的军事统治过渡。由于担心新的文官政府会对玉矿开采行使权力,军方在采矿乡发起了暴力活动。使用冲突和玉矿的地理编码数据,作者找到了这种战略性使用暴力的证据。随着缅甸于2011年开始转型,军方在玉矿区挑起的冲突急剧上升。文章还讨论了其他解释,包括军队战略的转变、矿山和军事总部的托管、商品价格、反对有争议的大坝、和特定于克钦邦的趋势。对于缅甸以外的影响,作者认为,即将离任的将军可以利用不稳定来保留租金,而对国家权威的看似合理的挑战者提供了暴力的借口。
更新日期:2019-03-12
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