This article asks why some Indian districts experience chronic Maoist violence while others do not. The answer helps to explain India’s Maoist civil war, which is the product of the accumulation of violence in a few districts, as well as to generate a new hypothesis about the causes of civil war more generally. The authors argue that, other things equal, the emergence of subaltern-led parties at the critical juncture before armed organizations enter crowds them out: the stronger the presence of subaltern-led political parties in a district at this juncture, the lower the likelihood of experiencing chronic armed violence subsequently. They develop their argument through field research and test its main prediction using an original, district-level data set on subaltern incorporation and Maoist violence in India between 1967 and 2008. The article contributes a new, party-based explanation to the literatures on both civil war and Maoist violence in India. It also introduces new district-level data on the Maoist movement and on the incorporation of subaltern ethnic groups by political parties in India.

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为什么民族底层领导的政党会排挤武装组织：解释印度的毛主义暴力

这篇文章询问为什么一些印度地区经历长期的毛派暴力，而另一些地区则没有。答案有助于解释印度的毛派内战，这是少数地区暴力积累的产物，也有助于对内战起因产生更普遍的新假设。作者认为，在其他条件相同的情况下，在武装组织进入之前的关键时刻出现的下层领导的政党将它们排挤：此时某个地区下层领导的政党的存在越强，出现这种情况的可能性就越低。随后经历了长期的武装暴力。他们通过实地研究发展他们的论点，并使用关于 1967 年至 2008 年间印度底层合并和毛派暴力的原始地区级数据集测试其主要预测。这篇文章为关于印度内战和毛派暴力的文献提供了一种新的、基于政党的解释。它还介绍了有关毛主义运动和印度政党纳入底层民族群体的新地区级数据。