The core doctrine of supersubstantivalism is that material objects are identical to their spacetime locations. One powerful consideration for the view is the argument from harmony—supersubstantivalism, it is claimed, is in a position to offer an elegant explanation of a number of platitudes concerning objects and their locations. However, I will argue that identifying material objects with their locations does not provide a satisfying explanation of harmony. What the supersubstantivalist needs is not a theory about the identity of objects, but another theory about the identity of some relations. This paper proposes such a theory and shows that with it in place, the argument from harmony can be repaired.

中文翻译：

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超实体主义与和谐论

超实体主义的核心学说是，物质对象与其时空位置相同。对该观点的一个有力的考虑是来自和谐的论点，据称，超实在主义能够对有关物体及其位置的许多陈词滥调提供优雅的解释。但是，我将争辩说，识别具有其位置的物质对象并不能提供令人满意的和谐解释。超实体主义者所需要的不是关于物体同一性的理论，而是关于某种关系的同一性的另一种理论。本文提出了这样一个理论，并表明，有了它，和谐的观点就可以得到修复。