Fine, Lowe and Hale accept the view that necessity is to be explained by essences: Necessarily p iff, and because, there is some x whose essence ensures that p. Hale, however, believes that this strategy is not universally applicable; he argues that the necessity of essentialist truths cannot itself be explained by once again appealing to essentialist truths. As a consequence, Hale holds that there are basic necessities that cannot be explained. Thus, Hale style essentialism falls short of what Wilsch calls the explanation‐challenge (EC) for the metaphysics of necessity. Without endorsing the EC, I argue that Hale's argument for basic, unexplained necessities fails due to a misunderstanding of the structure of essentialist explanations. Getting clear about the structure of essentialist explanations of necessity leads to a re‐evaluation of crucial circularity‐ and regress‐arguments that have been discussed in the debate about essentialism.

中文翻译：

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必要性的本质主义解释的结构

好吧，Lowe 和 Hale 接受这样的观点，即必然性由本质来解释：必然 p iff，并且因为，存在一些 x，其本质确保 p。然而，黑尔认为这种策略并不普遍适用。他认为，本质主义真理的必要性本身不能通过再次诉诸本质主义真理来解释。因此，黑尔认为存在无法解释的基本必需品。因此，黑尔式本质主义不符合威尔施所说的对必然性形而上学的解释挑战（EC）。在不支持 EC 的情况下，我认为黑尔关于基本的、无法解释的必要性的论点由于对本质主义解释结构的误解而失败。