Abstract

The right to freedom of religion or belief is one of the most controversial fundamental human rights, and an increasing number of cases on religious freedom highlight the need for normative clarity about its limits. Courts across jurisdictions adopt different approaches to justifying limitations to religious claims in order to resolve conflicts. This article identifies current key approaches to justifying limits to religious practices before proposing a perfectionist version of the harm principle as an alternative. Section 1 sets out the complexities of determining the limitations to religious freedom. Section 2 identifies the shortcomings of four dominant approaches to limitations, and these include the following categories: (i) practices deemed to be against the liberal democratic order; (ii) practices that breach the duty of neutrality; (iii) practices that do not constitute a core religious belief; and (iv) the choice of alternatives. Section 3 proposes a typology of harms to the autonomy of others as a model for limitations to religious freedom. Section 4 concludes by emphasizing the need for consistency in deciding limitations.

中文翻译：

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宗教自由权的局限性：重新思考关键方法

摘要

宗教或信仰自由权是最有争议的基本人权之一，关于宗教自由的案件越来越多，这突出表明需要对其界限进行规范的澄清。各个司法管辖区的法院采用不同的方法来证明限制宗教主张的合理性，以解决冲突。本文在提出完美主义版本的伤害原则作为替代方法之前，先确定了当前合理的关键方法，以证明对宗教活动的限制。第1节阐述了确定宗教自由限制的复杂性。第2节指出了限制的四种主要方法的缺点，其中包括以下几类：（i）被认为违背自由民主秩序的做法；（ii）违反中立义务的做法；（iii）不构成核心宗教信仰的习俗；（iv）选择替代方案。第三部分提出了危害他人自治的类型学，以此作为限制宗教自由的典范。第4节在强调限制时强调了一致性。