Carl Schmitt’s critique of political romanticism is neglected in comparison with his other interventions from the early Weimar period, yet its analysis of the metaphysical foundations of liberalism has important implications for his legal thought. This article examines the significance of Schmitt’s account of political romanticism from a jurisprudential perspective. It sets out from the question whether—as is often asserted or intimated—Schmitt’s own thought in the Weimar period represents a decisionistic variant of political romanticism. I contend that, while partly justified, this allegation does not take one to the centre of either political romanticism or the motivations for Schmitt’s anti-liberal jurisprudence. In order to do justice to both themes, it is necessary to reflect on the reasons for Schmitt’s inability to find a heteronomous, divine or otherwise, source of legitimation for law. Section 1 outlines the central strands of Schmitt’s polemic against political romanticism. Section 2 applies this analysis to the concept of constituent power with a view to untangling the strands of political romanticism in Schmitt’s conceptualization of sovereignty. Section 3 then considers the extent to which Schmitt’s later appeal to ‘concrete order thinking’ (konkrete Ordnungsdenken) is capable of providing a more adequate normative foundation for legitimate legal order.

中文翻译：

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卡尔·施密特的政治浪漫主义与法律基础

与魏玛早期的其他干预相比，卡尔·史密特对政治浪漫主义的批评被忽略了，但是对自由主义的形而上学基础的分析对他的法律思想具有重要意义。本文从法学角度考察了施密特对政治浪漫主义所作论述的意义。它从这样一个问题出发：在魏玛时期，施密特自己的思想是否像通常被断言或暗示的那样代表着政治浪漫主义的决定性变体。我认为，尽管有部分根据，但这一指控并没有成为政治浪漫主义或施密特反自由法学动机的中心。为了对这两个主题都公平，有必要思考一下施密特无法找到异质性的原因，神性或其他方式，是法律合法性的来源。第1节概述了施密特针对政治浪漫主义进行的辩论的主要内容。第2节将这种分析应用于组成权力的概念，以期弄清施密特主权概念中的政治浪漫主义思想。然后，第3节考虑了施密特后来对“具体秩序思维”的诉求的程度（konkrete Ordnungsdenken）能够为合法法律秩序提供更充分的规范基础。