In this paper, we present an algorithmic framework for signal-geometry-based approaches of GNSS spoofing detection. We formulate a simple vs. simple hypothesis test independent of nuisance parameters that results in significantly reduced missed detection probability compared to prior approaches. It is highly tractable such that it can be computed online by the receiver. We employ a hypothesis iteration framework that finds spoofed subsets of satellites efficiently and accounts for the presence of weak multipath, for a provable decision behavior in safety-of-life applications. We support the theoretical derivations by showing results on previously published simulated and on-air data sets. We validate the measurement model and show robustness to multipath with flight data from a Dual Polarization Antenna (DPA) mounted on a C12 aircraft. Finally, we show the algorithm's benefit on data recorded during a government-sponsored live spoofing event.

中文翻译：

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通过空间处理进行 GNSS 欺骗检测

在本文中，我们提出了一种基于信号几何的 GNSS 欺骗检测方法的算法框架。我们制定了一个独立于干扰参数的简单与简单假设检验，与先前的方法相比，这导致漏检概率显着降低。它非常易于处理，因此可以由接收器在线计算。我们采用了一个假设迭代框架，它可以有效地找到欺骗的卫星子集，并说明弱多径的存在，从而在生命安全应用中做出可证明的决策行为。我们通过显示先前发布的模拟和直播数据集的结果来支持理论推导。我们通过安装在 C12 飞机上的双极化天线 (DPA) 的飞行数据验证了测量模型并展示了对多路径的稳健性。最后，