Scholars have recently shown how in Europe regimes in democratic decay (e.g. Poland, Hungary) take all sorts of measures targeting and marginalizing political opponents. Although they are authoritarian by nature, the measures are cast in a legal form. According to some scholars this kind of authoritarian rule of law can be best understood as a dual state, namely a combination of the normative state (the rule of law) and the prerogative state (the pure—political or arbitrary—will of those in power). Building on these insights, the present paper makes two new observations. First, administrative law is distinctively well suited to cater for the creation of a dual state. By distinctively I mean better than civil and criminal law. In fact, I argue that administrative law constitutes a dual state in and of itself combining normative and prerogative state elements within a single area of law, in ways that cannot be done under civil and criminal law. Second, not only regimes in democratic decay but also liberal democracies make use of the dual state nature of administrative law. The paper illustrates this point with two techniques whereby liberal democracies use administrative law to circumvent or pervert the normal operation of criminal law, namely crimmigration and the alien detention of citizens. My underlying normative point is to draw attention to the inherent authoritarian potential of administrative law.

最近，学者们展示了在欧洲，民主衰落的政权（例如波兰，匈牙利）如何采取各种针对和排斥政治对手的措施。尽管这些措施本质上是专制的，但都是以法律形式强制执行的。一些学者认为，这种威权法治可以最好地理解为双重状态，即规范状态（法治）和特权状态（当权者的纯政治或任意意志）的结合。 ）。在这些见解的基础上，本文提出了两个新的观察结果。首先，行政法特别适合迎合双重国家的创建。我的意思是比民法和刑法更好。实际上，我认为，行政法是一个双重状态，其本身在单一法律领域内将规范性和特权性国家要素结合在一起，这是民法和刑法无法做到的。其次，不仅民主衰落的政权，而且自由民主制也利用行政法的双重国家性质。本文通过两种技巧来说明这一点，自由民主制利用这两种技巧来规避或改变刑法的正常运作，即刑事移徙和公民的外国人拘留。我的基本规范点是提请人们注意行政法的固有威权潜力。不仅民主衰落的政权，而且自由民主制也利用了行政法的双重国家性质。本文通过两种技巧来说明这一点，自由民主制利用这两种技巧来规避或改变刑法的正常运作，即刑事移徙和公民的外国人拘留。我的基本规范点是提请人们注意行政法的固有威权潜力。不仅民主衰落的政权，而且自由民主制也利用了行政法的双重国家性质。本文通过两种技巧来说明这一点，自由民主制利用这两种技巧来规避或改变刑法的正常运作，即刑事移徙和公民的外国人拘留。我的基本规范点是提请人们注意行政法的固有威权潜力。