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Pricing and ordering strategies in a two-echelon supply chain under price discount policy: a Stackelberg game approach
Journal of Management Analytics ( IF 6.554 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-23 , DOI: 10.1080/23270012.2021.1911697
Rubi Das 1 , Pijus Kanti De 1 , Abhijit Barman 1
Affiliation  

Supply chain management coordinates different strategies for the production system. The manufacturer requires some incentive schemes to motivate the retailer to change his policy, optimal for the whole system. This paper suggests a discount mechanism by which companies can coordinate their ordering and pricing strategies throughout a supply chain model with a single manufacturer and single retailer. Also, the demand curve is iso-elastic price sensitive. Channel members have decided their selling price and order quantity jointly and independently to maximize the supply chain profit. A coordination mechanism is proposed based on quantity discounts to correlate pricing and ordering strategies simultaneously. The decentralized case is analyzed under the manufacturer-Stackelberg game approach. The result of numerical investigation shows that the suggested discount mechanism has improved the supply chain profit as well as each channel member's profit in comparison with the centralized and decentralized decisions without discount.



中文翻译:

价格折扣政策下的两级供应链定价和订购策略:Stackelberg 博弈方法

供应链管理协调生产系统的不同策略。制造商需要一些激励计划来激励零售商改变他的政策,这对整个系统来说是最佳的。本文提出了一种折扣机制,通过该机制,公司可以在单一制造商和单一零售商的整个供应链模型中协调他们的订购和定价策略。此外,需求曲线对等弹性价格敏感。渠道成员共同独立决定销售价格和订单数量,以实现供应链利润最大化。提出了一种基于数量折扣的协调机制,以同时关联定价和订购策略。在制造商-Stackelberg 博弈方法下分析分散的情况。

更新日期:2021-05-23
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