Abstract

We analyze how the choice of firm ownership structure mitigates the effect of high dependence on a corrupt host government when investing abroad. We draw on a unique dataset of subsidiary-level engagement in corruption of 175 foreign subsidiaries entering three Central American countries. We found that there are two mechanisms to mitigate corrupt behavior when a subsidiary is dependent on a corrupt host government: internal legitimacy that accrues to wholly-owned subsidiaries, and external legitimacy built through a strong regional presence. The effect of dependency on a corrupt host government can be mitigated by enacting internal and external legitimacies.

摘要

我们分析了企业所有权结构的选择如何减轻在海外投资时对腐败东道国政府的高度依赖的影响。我们利用进入三个中美洲国家的 175 家外国子公司的子公司层面参与腐败的独特数据集。我们发现，当子公司依赖于腐败的东道国政府时，有两种机制可以减轻腐败行为：全资子公司产生的内部合法性，以及通过强大的区域存在建立的外部合法性。通过制定内部和外部合法性，可以减轻对腐败的东道国政府的依赖影响。