Abstract

Cartel damage occurs in many different shapes. Actors that are beyond doubt heavily affected by a cartel agreement are the purchasers of the cartel—the direct same as the indirect ones. Economic insights teach us that they do not only suffer damage in the form of the overcharge they paid or of shares of this overcharge that are passed-on to lower levels in the supply chain, but also in the form of the volume effect: a price increase as induced by a cartel agreement leads to a reduction in quantities sold, the consequence of which is typically lost profit—ie the volume effect. Whereas this effect is firmly established in economics, on the legal side it is so far discussed only on a superficial level with legal practice lacking behind in its recognition altogether. This is particularly surprising in the German and Spanish legal order where the highest courts many years ago did recognize the relevance of this damage component in pass-on situations. This article thoroughly analyses the economic and legal perspectives in respect of volume effects.

中文翻译：

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卡特尔案件中的体积效应——损害量化的特殊挑战？

摘要

卡特尔损害以许多不同的形式发生。毫无疑问，受卡特尔协议严重影响的行为者是卡特尔的购买者——直接购买者与间接购买者相同。经济见解告诉我们，他们不仅会因支付的超额费用或被传递到供应链中较低级别的超额费用份额而遭受损害，而且还会以数量效应的形式受到损害：价格由卡特尔协议引起的增加导致销售数量减少，其结果通常是利润损失——即数量效应。尽管这种效应在经济学中是牢固确立的，但在法律方面，迄今为止仅在肤浅的层面上对其进行了讨论，而法律实践则完全缺乏对其的认识。这在德国和西班牙的法律秩序中尤其令人惊讶，许多年前最高法院确实承认这种损害成分在传递情况下的相关性。本文深入分析了数量效应方面的经济和法律观点。