The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed consistently in tannaitic and amoraic literature. While presumptions are exclusionary rules, circumscribing doubt, “for I say” is an inclusionary rule, validating doubt. The versatility of the “for I say” rule testifies to its preliminary nature – while the outcome is determined by a robust set of primary decision rules. “For I say” should be read as: for I can say, legitimizing doubt and calling on primary rabbinic rules for treating cases of factual uncertainty, in contestable instances.

拉比成语“因为我说”（שאני אומר)在语言学上被解释为一种特定类型的推定，以第一人称修辞为支撑。从法律分析的角度来看，我认为“因为我说”和推定是截然相反的决策规则，在丹奈和阿莫拉文学中始终如一。虽然推定是排除性规则，限制怀疑，但“因为我说”是包含性规则，证实怀疑。“for I say”规则的多功能性证明了它的初步性质——而结果由一组强大的主要决策规则决定。“因为我说”应该被理解为：因为我可以说，在有争议的情况下，使怀疑合法化并呼吁主要的拉比规则来处理事实不确定的情况。