Abstract

This article defends indirect libertarianism against those arguments which attempt to show that blameworthiness cannot be traced back to earlier blameworthy acts in most cases. More precisely, I focus on those arguments according to which responsibility cannot be traced back in most cases because agents are unable to foresee the distant consequences of their acts . Since indirect libertarianism claims that we are responsible for many actions, omissions, beliefs, attitudes because they can be traced back to earlier free acts, the success of the arguments against tracing would be fatal to indirect libertarianism. In the literature, there are some answers to the problem of tracing, but they are either implausible or unacceptable for indirect libertarians who hold that indeterministic free decisions are the ultimate sources of moral responsibility. On the basis of works by Björnsson, Persson, Robichaud, and Wieland, I provide a solution to the problem of tracing that preserves the crucial role of indeterministic decisions. In other words, I provide a libertarian solution to the problem of tracing.

摘要

本文为间接自由意志主义辩护，反对那些试图表明在大多数情况下不能追溯到早期应受谴责的行为的论点。更准确地说，我关注那些在大多数情况下无法追溯责任的论点，因为代理人无法预见他们行为的遥远后果。由于间接自由主义声称我们对许多行为、疏忽、信念、态度负责，因为它们可以追溯到更早的自由行为，因此反对追踪的论点的成功对间接自由主义来说将是致命的。在文献中，对追踪问题有一些答案，但对于认为不确定的自由决定是道德责任的最终来源的间接自由主义者来说，这些答案要么不可信，要么不可接受。在 Björnsson、Persson、Robichaud 和 Wieland 的作品的基础上，我提供了一个解决追踪问题的方法，它保留了不确定性决策的关键作用。换句话说，我为追踪问题提供了一个自由主义的解决方案。