Abstract

Obligation incompatibilism is the view that determinism precludes moral obligation. I argue for the following. (i) Two principles, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and ‘ought not’ is equivalent to ‘impermissible’, generate a powerful argument for obligation incompatibilism. (ii) Assuming conceptual ties between blameworthiness and impermissibility or belief in impermissibility, these principles also imperil blameworthiness provided determinism is true. If determinism undermines blameworthiness, it also undermines proposed justifications of punishment that presuppose blameworthiness. Allegedly blameworthiness-free justifications of punishment fare no better given their moral presuppositions. (iii) The most promising compatibilist reply to the argument for obligation incompatibilism should concede that obligation requires alternatives but of a variety that one can have even if determinism is true.

摘要

义务不相容论认为决定论排除了道德义务。我主张以下。(i) 两个原则，“应该”意味着“可以”，“不应该”等同于“不允许”，为义务不相容主义提供了有力的论据。(ii) 假设可指责性与不可容忍性或相信不可容忍性之间存在概念联系，如果决定论为真，这些原则也会危及可指责性。如果决定论破坏了应受谴责性，它也破坏了以应受谴责性为前提的惩罚的提议理由。考虑到他们的道德预设，据称无过错的惩罚理由也好不到哪儿去。