It is often held that people have a moral right to believe and say whatever they want. For instance, one might claim that they have a right to believe racist things as long as they keep those thoughts to themselves. Or, one might claim that they have a right to pursue any scholarly question they want as long as they do so with a civil tone. This paper rejects those claims and argues that no one has such unlimited moral rights. Part 1 explores the value of the freedoms of thought and expression. Part 2 argues against the unlimited moral right to free expression, focusing in particular on the special obligations and moral constraints that obtain for academics. Part 3 argues against the unlimited moral right to free thought.

中文翻译：

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自由思想和表达权利的限制。

人们通常认为，人们有道德权利去相信和说出他们想说的任何话。例如，人们可能会声称他们有权相信种族主义的事情，只要他们不去想这些事情。或者，人们可能会声称他们有权提出任何他们想要的学术问题，只要他们以文明的语气这样做。本文驳斥了这些主张，并认为没有人拥有这种无限的精神权利。第 1 部分探讨了思想和表达自由的价值。第 2 部分反对无限的自由表达的道德权利，特别关注学术界获得的特殊义务和道德约束。第 3 部分反对自由思想的无限道德权利。