Since 2015 European and national audit offices have been expressing discontent with their audit powers regarding banking supervision. Key to this discontent is the European Court of Auditor’s limited mandate vis-à-vis the ECB’s supervisory activities, which in practice means that the former does not have towards the ECB’s Single Supervisory Mechanism the same full audit powers it has vis-à-vis all other EU institutions and agencies. This limitation is ultimately based on the principle of central bank independence as enshrined in Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In addition to the above, national auditors have recently criticized their alleged difficulty to access all relevant information concerning supervision of less significant banks, since some documents may be considered by the ECB to be not accessible to national audit offices. These two aspects limiting the power of European and national audit offices (also identified as the first and second audit gap) seem to be related since the latter gap arises in part from the restricted mandate regarding the supervision of the ECB’s supervisory function. This article explores the conditions for the existence of an audit gap and its real significance, mainly by assessing whether national audit offices had a mandate to audit their banking supervisor in the first place. It also addresses the formula of a memorandum of understanding agreed between the ECA and the ECB with the purpose of enhancing the cooperation between both institutions in the context of an audit to the ECB’s supervisor function, and the role of the L-bank judgement in the understanding of the relations between the European Court of Auditors, the ECB, the national audit offices and national banking supervisors.

自 2015 年以来，欧洲和国家审计机构一直对其银行监管方面的审计权力表示不满。这种不满的关键是欧洲审计院对欧洲央行监督活动的授权有限，这在实践中意味着前者对欧洲央行的单一监督机制没有与对欧洲央行的单一监督机制相同的全面审计权力。所有其他欧盟机构和机构。这一限制最终基于《欧盟运作条约》第 130 条规定的中央银行独立性原则。除上述之外，国家审计师最近批评称，他们难以获得所有与监管不那么重要的银行相关的信息，因为欧洲央行可能认为某些文件是国家审计部门无法获取的。限制欧洲和国家审计机构权力的这两个方面（也被称为第一和第二审计差距）似乎是相关的，因为后一个差距部分源于欧洲央行监管职能的监督任务受限。本文探讨了审计缺口存在的条件及其实际意义，主要通过评估各国审计机构是否有权对其银行业监管机构进行审计。它还讨论了 ECA 和 ECB 之间商定的谅解备忘录的公式，目的是在对 ECB 监管职能进行审计的背景下加强两个机构之间的合作，