The aim of the article is to define and investigate an interpretative framework for the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein, a student of Twardowski in Lwów (Lvov, Lviv) and Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. The author defends the thesis that it is justified to refer to Blaustein’s philosophy not as phenomenology sensu stricto, but as a phenomenologically-oriented descriptive psychology related but not equivalent to the project expounded by Husserl in the first edition of Logische Untersuchungen as well as in his project of phenomenological psychology (as formulated in 1925). The article traces Blaustein’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological methods, putting it in the historical context of the discussion with Ingarden. Next, the author juxtaposes Blaustein’s understanding of psychology with Husserl’s project of 1925, which makes it possible to identify not only the differences between the two projects, but also their similarities. The article also raises questions about the scope of descriptive-psychological analyses.

这篇文章的目的是定义和研究 Leopold Blaustein 哲学的解释框架，他是 Lwów（利沃夫，利沃夫）的 Twardowski 和弗莱堡的胡塞尔的学生。作者辩护的论点是，将布劳斯坦的哲学称为不是严格意义上的现象学，而是将其称为现象学导向的描述心理学，与胡塞尔在第一版Logische Untersuchungen 中阐述的项目相关但不等同于该项目是有道理的。以及他的现象学心理学项目（1925 年制定）。这篇文章追溯了布劳斯坦对胡塞尔现象学方法的批判，并将其置于与英加登讨论的历史背景中。接下来，作者将布劳斯坦对心理学的理解与胡塞尔 1925 年的项目并置，这使得不仅可以识别两个项目之间的差异，还可以识别它们的相似之处。这篇文章还对描述性心理分析的范围提出了问题。