The paper distinguishes between two conceptions of kinds defined by constitutive rules, the one suggested by Searle, and the one invoked by Williamson to define assertion. Against recent arguments to the contrary by Maitra, Johnson and others, it argues for the superiority of the latter in the first place as an account of games. On this basis, the paper argues that the alleged disanalogies between real games and language games suggested in the literature in fact don’t exist. The paper relies on Rawls’s distinction between types (“blueprints”, as Rawls called them) of practices and institutions defined by constitutive rules, and those among them that are actually in force, and hence are truly normative; it defends along Rawlsian lines that a plurality of norms apply to actual instances of rule-constituted practices, and uses this Rawlsian line to block the examples that Maitra, Johnson and others provide to sustain their case.

这篇论文区分了由构成规则定义的两种类型概念，一种是 Searle 建议的，另一种是 Williamson 用来定义断言的。与 Maitra、Johnson 和其他人最近提出的相反的论点相反，它首先论证了后者在游戏方面的优越性。在此基础上，论文认为，文献中所谓的真实游戏与语言游戏之间的差异实际上并不存在。该论文依赖于罗尔斯对由构成性规则定义的实践和制度的类型（“蓝图”，如罗尔斯所称）与其中实际有效的那些类型之间的区别，因此是真正的规范；它沿着罗尔斯的路线辩护，即多种规范适用于规则构成的实践的实际实例，并使用这条罗尔斯的路线来阻止迈特拉、约翰逊和其他人提供的例子来支持他们的观点。