当前位置: X-MOL 学术J. Public Econ. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
The economics of religious communities
Journal of Public Economics ( IF 8.262 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-30 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104481
Jean-Paul Carvalho 1 , Michael Sacks 2
Affiliation  

The religious club model is central to the economics of religion. To expand its scope for application, we develop the first model to combine (i) increasing returns to membership, (ii) discrimination, and (iii) religious competition. Any degree of non-rivalry in religious club goods introduces scale effects which require new analytical techniques. Due to increasing returns, a religious leader faces a trade-off between forming a large inclusive club and screening out less committed types to form a small strict club. Endogenous screening makes religious strictness a non-monotonic function of economic development, which is consistent with the emergence of strict sects following periods of liberalization and economic growth. Blanket discrimination against all community members makes the religious community stricter and more cohesive, explaining the survival of religious sects and minorities under persecution. Stigmatizing actively religious members promotes social integration on the whole, but can create an extreme isolationist sect. Contrary to prior work on religious markets, we uncover a mechanism by which religious competition reduces religious participation and boosts social integration. Thus, attempts to moderate religion by stigmatizing participation and restricting competition could backfire. Finally, our model provides guidance for empirical work on religious discrimination and further extensions of the religious club model.



中文翻译:

宗教团体的经济学

宗教俱乐部模式是宗教经济学的核心。为了扩大其应用范围,我们开发了第一个模型,将 (i) 增加会员回报、(ii) 歧视和 (iii) 宗教竞争结合起来。宗教俱乐部商品的任何程度的非竞争都会引入规模效应,这需要新的分析技术。由于回报增加,宗教领袖面临着在组建大型包容性俱乐部和筛选出不太忠诚的类型以组建小型严格俱乐部之间的权衡。内生性筛选使宗教严格成为经济发展的非单调函数,这与自由化和经济增长时期后严格教派的出现是一致的。对所有社区成员的全面歧视使宗教社区更加严格和凝聚力,解释受迫害的宗教教派和少数民族的生存。对积极的宗教成员进行污名化从整体上促进了社会融合,但可能会造成极端的孤立主义教派。与之前在宗教市场上的工作相反,我们发现了一种机制,通过这种机制,宗教竞争会减少宗教参与并促进社会融合。因此,通过诋毁参与和限制竞争来缓和宗教的尝试可能会适得其反。最后,我们的模型为宗教歧视的实证工作和宗教俱乐部模型的进一步扩展提供了指导。我们揭示了宗教竞争减少宗教参与并促进社会融合的机制。因此,通过诋毁参与和限制竞争来缓和宗教的尝试可能会适得其反。最后,我们的模型为宗教歧视的实证工作和宗教俱乐部模型的进一步扩展提供了指导。我们揭示了宗教竞争减少宗教参与并促进社会融合的机制。因此,通过诋毁参与和限制竞争来缓和宗教的尝试可能会适得其反。最后,我们的模型为宗教歧视的实证工作和宗教俱乐部模型的进一步扩展提供了指导。

更新日期:2021-07-30
down
wechat
bug