This essay explores the relationship between moral epistemology and legal theory in Islamic thought. Reviewing selected works of Khomeini, Maududi, and Qutb, I show that Islamism, drawing upon certain currents of Muslim intellectual tradition, presupposes a rejection of moral rationalism and on that basis opposes the permanent alteration of explicit divine injunctions. Next, I argue that the unwillingness of ‘Abduh, Iqbal, and Soroush to articulate a consistent moral rationalism prevents these reformists from offering a tenable theoretical alternative to Islamist legalism. I subsequently consider the moral epistemology of classical Mu‘tazili scholar ‘Abd al-Jabbar in order to show how a robust moral rationalism justifies the prudential revision of divine law. On that basis, I suggest that moral rationalism is the necessary epistemic basis of any legal theory that stands as a clear alternative to Islamism while still remaining grounded in the most fundamental tenets of Muslim piety.

中文翻译：

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道德认识论与伊斯兰教神法的修正

本文探讨了伊斯兰思想中道德认识论与法律理论之间的关系。回顾霍梅尼、莫杜迪和库特布的精选作品，我表明伊斯兰主义利用穆斯林知识传统的某些潮流，以拒绝道德理性主义为前提，并在此基础上反对对明确的神圣禁令的永久改变。接下来，我认为，阿卜杜赫、伊克巴尔和索鲁什不愿表达一贯的道德理性主义，这使这些改革主义者无法为伊斯兰法制主义提供一个站得住脚的理论替代方案。随后，我考虑了古典穆塔齐利学者阿卜杜勒贾巴尔的道德认识论，以表明强有力的道德理性主义如何证明对神圣法律的审慎修订是正当的。在此基础上，