Banks considered too-big-to-fail (TBTF) tend to benefit from funding cost advantages as their debt is considered implicitly guaranteed by public authorities, even if the latter have undertaken substantial effort to limit TBTF. This paper focuses on the changes in related market perceptions in response to bank regulatory and resolution reform announcements as well as actual failure resolution actions. It analyses how premia on risky bank debt have reacted to such events, using data for senior and subordinated debt CDS quotes for 45 European banks from January 2007 to May 2020. The empirical results are consistent with progress being made in reducing the value of implicit bank debt guarantees, especially on subordinated bank liabilities. Some earlier bank failure resolution actions appeared to significantly raise risk premia, although more recent failure resolution cases either had no effect on risk premia or moved them in the opposite direction. Several of these events consisted of no-action, that is, in particular, they did not entail any bail-in. As opposed to resolution actions, the reactions of risk premia to policy and regulatory announcements are more difficult to explain and no clear pattern seems to be emerging, confirming the view that action speaks louder than words.

被认为太大而不能倒闭 (TBTF) 的银行往往会受益于融资成本优势，因为它们的债务被认为是由公共当局隐性担保，即使后者已采取大量措施来限制 TBTF。本文重点关注相关市场认知因银行监管和决议改革公告以及实际破产决议行动而发生的变化。它使用 2007 年 1 月至 2020 年 5 月 45 家欧洲银行的优先和次级债务 CDS 报价数据，分析了风险银行债务溢价对此类事件的反应。实证结果与在降低隐性银行价值方面取得的进展一致债务担保，尤其是次级银行负债。一些较早的银行倒闭解决措施似乎显着提高了风险溢价，尽管最近的失败解决案例要么对风险溢价没有影响，要么将它们推向相反的方向。其中一些事件是不采取行动的，也就是说，特别是，它们不需要任何纾困。与解决行动相反，风险溢价对政策和监管公告的反应更难以解释，似乎没有出现明确的模式，证实了行动胜于雄辩的观点。