Can governments elected under mixed-member majoritarian (mmm) electoral systems use geographically targeted spending to increase their chances of staying in office, and if so, how? Although twenty-eight countries use mmm electoral systems, scant research has addressed this question. The authors explain how mmm’s combination of electoral systems in two unlinked tiers creates a distinct strategic environment in which a large party and a small party can trade votes in one tier for votes in the other tier in a way that increases the number of seats won by both. They then explain how governing parties dependent on vote trading can use geographically targeted spending to cement it. These propositions are tested using original data from Japan (2003–2013) and Mexico (2012–2016). In both cases, municipalities in which the supporters of governing parties split their ballots as instructed were found to have received more money after elections. The findings have broad implications for research on mmm electoral systems, distributive politics, and the politics of Japan and Mexico.

中文翻译：

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混合成员多数党选举制度中的地理目标支出

可以在混合成员多数党下选举产生的政府（嗯) 选举系统使用有针对性的地域支出来增加他们留任的机会，如果是，如何？尽管有 28 个国家使用嗯选举制度，很少有研究解决这个问题。作者解释了如何嗯的选举制度在两个不相连的层级的组合创造了一个独特的战略环境，一个大党和一个小党可以在一个层级的选票交换另一层级的选票，从而增加双方赢得的席位数量。然后，他们解释了依赖投票交易的执政党如何利用有针对性的地理支出来巩固它。这些命题使用来自日本（2003-2013 年）和墨西哥（2012-2016 年）的原始数据进行了测试。在这两种情况下，执政党支持者按照指示分配选票的市政当局被发现在选举后收到了更多的钱。研究结果对研究具有广泛意义嗯选举制度、分配政治以及日本和墨西哥的政治。