We investigate a collective-choice bargaining model under minimal assumptions. In this model, the set of alternatives is arbitrary; each player’s utility function is nonnegative-valued; the decision rule is monotonic; the probability of each player’s being recognized as a proposer depends only on the tuple of actions in the previous round; any player is perfectly patient. We show that for any alternative, it is in the core if and only if there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) such that it is proposed by every player and implemented with certainty.

中文翻译：

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最小假设下集体选择谈判的核心等效性

我们在最小假设下研究了集体选择谈判模型。在这个模型中，备选方案集是任意的；每个参与者的效用函数都是非负值的；决策规则是单调的；每个玩家被识别为提议者的概率仅取决于上一轮行动的元组；任何球员都非常有耐心。我们表明，对于任何替代方案，当且仅当存在一个静止的子博弈完美均衡（SSPE）并且每个参与者都提出并确定实施时，它才是核心。