The United Kingdom Government has undertaken unprecedented economic activity to support UK business during the COVID-19 pandemic. This article applies the law and economics of corporate bankruptcy to these provisions. In particular, it examines whether legal responses to the pandemic encourage Type I bankruptcy errors (where a company that could be saved enters a terminal insolvency process) or Type II bankruptcy errors (where a company that could not be saved avoids a terminal insolvency process). Whilst more could undoubtedly have been done, it seems that the UK Government's actions to avoid Type I errors arising from the pandemic may have caused Type II errors. More pertinently, it is almost impossible for the UK Government to lift these protections in a neutral way – if all are uniformly lifted too soon, then this will result in Type I errors; if all are uniformly lifted too late, then this will result in Type II errors. It is impossible and undesirable to decide when to lift protections on a case-by-case basis, and any attempt to selectively lift protections results in the UK Government deciding which sectors have advantages post-COVID-19 and which do not. Accordingly, in setting and lifting legal protections, the UK Government finds itself a key market actor in deciding the post-COVID-19 shape of the UK market.

中文翻译：

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缓解封锁的法律和经济学：英国的破产错误

在 COVID-19 大流行期间，英国政府采取了前所未有的经济活动来支持英国企业。本文将公司破产的法律和经济学适用于这些规定。特别是，它研究了对大流行的法律反应是否会鼓励第一类破产错误（可以挽救的公司进入最终破产程序）或第二类破产错误（无法挽救的公司避免最终破产程序） . 虽然毫无疑问可以做更多的事情，但英国政府为避免大流行引起的第一类错误的行动似乎可能导致了第二类错误。更重要的是，英国政府几乎不可能以中立的方式解除这些保护措施——如果所有这些保护措施都统一解除得太早，那么这将导致 I 类错误；如果所有都统一解除太晚，那么这将导致 II 类错误。根据具体情况决定何时取消保护是不可能也不可取的，任何有选择地取消保护的尝试都会导致英国政府决定哪些部门在 COVID-19 之后具有优势，哪些部门没有优势。因此，在制定和取消法律保护方面，英国政府发现自己是决定 COVID-19 后英国市场形态的关键市场参与者。